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The Upper Silesian Mixed Commission ('Mixed Commission' or 'Commission') was a  quasijudicial body instituted pursuant to the Convention between Germany and Poland relating to Upper Silesia of 15 May 1922 ('Geneva Convention' or 'GC') . The aim of the Geneva Convention, concluded for a transitional period of 15 years ending on 15 July 1937, was to alleviate the economic, social, and minority rights implications of the partition of Upper Silesia, a closely-knit industrial area inhabited by both Poles and Germans of various creeds. Within the framework of the Geneva Convention, the main purpose of the Mixed Commission, located in Katowice/Kattowitz, in Polish Upper Silesia, was to settle disputes between the two States Parties regarding the implementation of the agreement, whereas individual claims of that nature came under the jurisdiction of a second international supervising agency, the  Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal situated in Beuthen/Bytom, in German Upper Silesia. In addition, the president of the Mixed Commission was given the power to issue nonbinding opinions regarding the compliance with minority rights in individual petitioners' cases.
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Owing to the reluctance of Germany and Poland to use the inter-State complaints mechanism, and the personal activism of the Commission's president, Felix Calonder (1863 -1952 , the protection of minority rights eventually became the activity most prominently associated with it. Whereas only 18 inter-State complaints reached the Commission, its president handled more than 3,400 minority rights cases, 127 of which resulted in 'opinions' (avis) which, while nonbinding, formally resembled judicial decisions. These numbers should be assessed bearing in mind the comparatively small caseload handled by the Council of the League of Nations between 1919 and 1939 ( Minority rights petitions: League of Nations) under all minority rights treaties combined: under this centralized procedure, which could also be used under the Geneva Convention, '950 petitions were filed, 758 were declared admissible, but only 16 petitions reached the agenda of the Council' ( Minority Protection System between World War I and World War II [MPEPIL] ). Due to their advisory character and insufficient backup by the Council of the League of Nations, Calonder's opinions were not always followed by the States Parties. Nevertheless, in some cases the combination of the debates at the Council of the League of Nations and Calonder's efforts did yield concrete results: thus, the Bernheim petition of 1933 eventually led to the suspension of anti-Jewish legislation in German Upper Silesia until 1937, and triggered an 'avalanche' of complaints (Karch, 2013, 140) which in many cases resulted in the compensation or reinstatement of Jewish officials, lawyers, doctors, and employees (Kaeckenbeeck, 1942, 266) . More generally, the opinions of the president of the Mixed Commission, which were published in two volumes after the Commission's cessation of activity, are very likely the most coherent body of international case law regarding the protection of individual and collective rights before the advent of present-day international human rights courts and treaty bodies. The comparison with postWorld War II international human rights law seems even more fitting if one takes into account that the Geneva Convention was the only minority rights protection treaty of the interwar period based on a bilateral agreement between two States rather than a unilateral commitment of a single State toward the League of Nations.
B. Historical Context: The Upper Silesian Issue and the Geneva Convention of 15 May 1922 3
The rebirth of the Polish State after World War I soon raised questions about the status of Upper Silesia. Although the region had not been part of the Polish Crown since the fourteenth century, the majority of its population spoke Polish, or the related Silesian dialect, as a mother tongue. However, even before its conquest by Prussia in 1742, it had also been subject to a strong German influence. These ties were considerably reinforced during the nineteenth century, when Upper Silesia developed into one of Europe's most heavily industrialized regions.
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After Germany was defeated in 1918, the Allies originally planned to attribute the region as a whole to Poland. However, as a result of German protestations, the Council of Four decided to divide it according to the results of a plebiscite (Art 88 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (1919) ['Treaty of Versailles']). The plebiscite was held on 20 March 1921, but the Inter-Allied Military Commission entrusted with its organization failed to agree upon a border line. As a result, the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied Powers referred the matter to an ad hoc Committee of Experts, who issued a report but were also unable to draw a new frontier. Eventually, the Council of the League of Nations was asked for arbitration. For diplomatic reasons, the Council of the League of Nations entrusted a committee of small powers (Belgium, Brazil, Chile, and Spain) to come up with a detailed plan. However, the actual work of drafting this plan was done by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, and most notably its young Deputy Secretary General, Jean Monnet (1888 Monnet ( -1979 . Monnet and his team came up with a new division, which included carving up the industrial area between the two States (Monnet, 1976, 102-6) . In order for the partition to go smoothly, the inhabitants and companies of Upper Silesia were to enjoy special rights during a transitional period of 15 years (it should be noted that the transitory character of the regime was a result of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied Powers' mandate to the Council of the League of Nations). The Council of the League of Nations recommended this solution to the Conference of Ambassadors (successor to the Supreme Council) which accepted the definitive boundary on 20
October 1921.
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The recommendations of the Council of the League of Nations to the Conference of Ambassadors included several temporary measures designed to ensure 'the continuity of the economic and social existence of Upper Silesia'. These measures were to be included in a bilateral convention; an Upper Silesian Mixed Commission was to supervise their application. A special procedure was developed by the Conference of Ambassadors in order to ensure the conclusion of a German-Polish convention. According to this procedure, the treaty was to be negotiated between a German and a Polish plenipotentiary; however, in case of disagreement, a casting vote was given to The Commission was composed of two Polish and two German members (Art 562 (1) GC), appointed by their respective Governments (Art 564 (2) GC). All had to show sufficient ties to Upper Silesia: they had to be either native Upper Silesians, or to be 'particularly versed in Upper Silesian conditions' as a result of their profession, their activities as civil servants, or their having resided in the region for several years (Art 562 (2) GC). In contrast to the members of the Arbitral Tribunal, they did not need to be jurists, nor were they subject to any guarantees of judicial independence. They could thus receive governmental instructions, as they in fact did. For Kaeckenbeeck, this was a sign of the Commission's slightly more diplomatic character (1942, at 29) . It also made it difficult to distinguish the members' activity from that of the State representatives, a fact which he criticized (1942, at 531).
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As a matter of fact, almost all appointees had highly political profiles. Thus, the Polish members were: Konstanty Wolny, lawyer, Marshal of the Silesian Diet (1922 -1927 Stanislaw Grabianowski, engineer (1922 -1934 Finance (1929 Finance ( -1934 ; Mieczyslaw Chmielewski, lawyer and member of the board of 'Wspólnota Interesów', a local mining and steel company (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) ; and Adam Stebłowski, adviser at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1936) (1937) . The German members were: Hans von Moltke, ambassador in Warsaw (1922 -1924 ; Dr Hans Lukaschek, Oberpräsident of German Upper Silesia (1922 -1927 ; Count Hans Praschma, representative of Upper Silesia at the Reichsrat (1924 Reichsrat ( -1935 ; Paulus van Husen, judge at the High Administrative Court at Berlin (1927 Berlin ( -1934 Count Hans Josef Matuschka, Oberregierungsrat (1934 and Gottfried Schwendy, Regierungsvizepräsident (1934-1937) .
President
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The Commission's president, who had to be of another nationality than the Commission's two According to Georges Kaeckenbeeck, State representatives played a crucial role with regard to the proper functioning of the Upper Silesian dispute settlement mechanisms, as they decided on 'the choice of legal arguments, the degree of weight to be attached to certain circumstances, and the decision whether the point of view of a particular authority was to be endorsed or not ' (1942, at 531) .
Their function as intermediaries between their respective governments and the Mixed Commission was confirmed by Article 585 GC, which instructed the president to 'draw their attention' to potential treaty violations should he notice any. When deemed necessary, direct discussions with local or national political authorities were also an option, especially in the field of minority rights. However, meetings of that nature were, as a rule, arranged through the relevant State representative (Kaeckenbeeck, 1942, 531-32) .
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Poland was represented by: Bronislaw Bouffall, professor at the University of Lublin (1922 Lublin ( -1923 ; Dr Zygmunt Przybylski, senator (1923 -1924 Dr Alexander Szczepański, Consul general (1924 -1929 ; Kazimierz Sąchocki, judge at the Supreme Administrative Tribunal in Warsaw (1929 Warsaw ( -1933 ; and Leon Babiński, university professor, legal adviser at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) . The German agents were: Karl Budding, head of the local government (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) ; Freiherr Werner von Grünau, Consul general, Undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) ; Count Raban Adelmann von Adelmannsfelden, minister plenipotentiary in Brussels (1931 Brussels ( -1934 and Dr Wilhelm Nöldeke, Consul general (1934-1937) .
Administrative Staff
14
The Mixed Commission comprised a secretariat, headed by a secretary-general, with the assistance of a secretary. The Commission's Head-of-Chancellery also served at its main interpreter. All agents of the Mixed Commission and their assistants were appointed by decision of the president, on a basis of parity and in agreement with both governments. The same procedure applied to the determination of their titles. The head of the administrative staff had to be a third-country national. All disciplinary powers were vested within the president. As part of the appointment procedure, all agents were asked to make the solemn promise to carry out their duty faithfully while shaking hands with the president. When dismissing a German or Polish staff member, the president had to refer the matter first to the Government of the person concerned.
Advisory Labour Committee 15
Article 586 GC provided for the establishment of an Advisory Labour Committee composed of a president and ten assessors. The president (neither Polish nor German) and two assessors (one Pole, one German) were appointed for three years by the governing body of the International Labour
Office. The two assessors had to be chosen by their respective governments amongst their country's experts in the field of labour legislation. They had to be neither employers nor employees. As for the remaining eight assessors, Poland and Germany each appointed four for one year. Of these, two had to be employers and the other two employees in their country's part of Upper Silesia. All had to be appointed in agreement with local labour unions and employers' organizations.
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The Advisory Labour Committee's role was to assist the Mixed Commission in disputes involving national labour legislation. As such, it was 'thought at first to have an important part to play' (Kaeckenbeeck, 1942, 391 , note 1). Although it was duly constituted, and given a prestigious president in the person of Albert Thomas (the first director of the International Labour Office), it never actually held any meetings.
Privileges and Immunities
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On the territories of both States, all agents of the Mixed Commission were given the same special protection in criminal matters as that enjoyed by the authorities and civil servants. The president of the Commission was competent to file complaints for criminal offences perpetrated against the Mixed Commission or its agents (Art 570 GC). He was also granted diplomatic privileges and immunities. So were its German and Polish members, but only on the territory of the other State.
Agents of the Commission, unless employed on the territory of their own State, enjoyed tax exemptions, immunity from jurisdiction in non-criminal matters relating to activities conducted in their official capacity, as well as from the obligation to testify in court for such activities. Similarly, the Commission's premises were inviolable (Art 572 GC). The president was given special identification Apart from its role as a dispute settlement body, the Mixed Commission was also granted wide-ranging powers to facilitate the conclusion of agreements required for the implementation of the Convention. In cases where Poland and Germany were unable to come up with a mutually agreeable text, Article 582 (1) GC enabled the Commission to table a draft agreement, provided that reaching such an agreement was 'urgent and indispensable for the execution and implementation' of the relevant treaty provisions. After being notified with this draft agreement, both parties were given one month to accept it or propose their own solution. If they failed to do so, they were presumed to have accepted the Commission's proposition, which then became binding upon them. In cases where agreements were not explicitly provided for by the Convention but still necessary for its implementation, Article 582 § 2 GC enabled Poland and Germany to jointly ask the Commission to provide a binding agreement proposal. However, this procedure was never actually used. were to remain in force, in principle, for another 15 years. Poland was thus barred from abrogating these laws during the transitional period, but would be able to do so once the treaty lapsed. The treaty specified that this included legislation on mining, industry, trade, or labour. This limitation of Polish sovereignty was somewhat lessened by the possibility of introducing new legislation, provided that it applied to the whole of Poland (legal unification was an important process in reunified Poland, where some regions were still applying Prussian and German laws, while others were subject to Austrian or Russian legislation or to provisions of the Code Napoléon). However, in the fields of land distribution and labour law, which were deemed especially sensitive, a supplementary condition was added: new laws had to be 'fit' (propres) to replace existing provisions. Whenever Germany felt this was not the case, it could refer the matter to the PCIJ. However, the drafters of the Geneva Convention wanted to prevent the two Governments from directly appealing to the PCIJ, for 'it was not unreasonably feared that a large number of statutory changes, of no great importance severally, might constantly be burdening that high tribunal' (Kaeckenbeeck, 1942, 36) . In order to prevent institutional gridlock, they designated the Mixed Commission as a filtering instance ( Case filtering;  Case pre-filtering). Under
Article 2 GC, the German State representative had two months to refer to the Commission a new Polish law his Government deemed unfit. If the Commission decided that the law was indeed 'of a nature (susceptible) to be submitted to the judgment' of the PCIJ, the German Government had two months to file a complaint before the Permanent Court. 
Minority Rights Petitions: Advisory Opinions of the President of the Commission 25
In order to allow for a 'uniform and equitable' application of its provisions regarding minority rights, Article 148 GC instructed both governments to establish a Minorities Office in their part of the territory. According to Articles 149-52 GC, these Minorities Offices were under the obligation to request the president's 'advisory opinion' (avis) whenever they had been unable to satisfy a petitioner's request. During the negotiations leading up to the Geneva Convention, Felix Calonder had tried to secure wider-ranging powers for the Commission's president by enabling him to issue 'recommendations'. As both Poland and Germany feared that this term might be subsequently interpreted as implying a legal obligation, they replaced it by the even less stringent 'advisory opinion' (Kaeckenbeeck, 1942, 223, note 1) . From a purely formal perspective, it was argued that giving the president of the Mixed Commission the right of issuing final decisions would have conflicted with the fact that the Upper Silesian minorities had been placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations and given the right to directly petition the Council of the League of Nations under Article 147 GC. As for the decision to entrust the protection of minorities to the president rather than the whole Commission, it was meant to reduce Polish and German interference. According to Kaeckenbeeck, this assumption proved to be wrong, as it reduced the Commission's esprit de corps and discouraged the Polish and German members from acting as conciliators (1942, at 224-25, 231 Minutes of proceedings were taken in both languages. Applications to the Commission had to be written in either German or Polish. The response had to be in the same language, unless the applicant had waived this right. All other official communications addressed to Germany or Poland had to be written in the language of the State concerned. Rules regarding internal use were equally detailed.
Thus, staff members were allowed to use both German and Polish when addressing each other.
Circulars of a general character had to be written in both languages, with Polish coming first, being the official language of the hosting State (Art 576 GC). Kaeckenbeeck criticized the potentially disruptive effect of these rules on the discussions and deliberations within both international organs. With regard to the Arbitral Tribunal, he makes clear that its operation would have been a 'sheer impossibility' had not its president, its members, and the State representatives informally agreed on German as the common  working language, and as the predominating language during hearings (1942, at 500-1).
Whether a similar solution was reached at the Mixed Commission could not be determined. According to Kaeckenbeeck, with regard to the collection of evidence, the ability to conduct on-thespot  investigations and to call upon parties and witnesses 'to appear before them and to speak the truth, even under oath and under penalty of perjury' made it impossible to distinguish the Mixed Commission from an arbitral tribunal (1942, at 358, 519 The written phase (case, counter-case, reply, rejoinder, consultations, etc) was followed by one or several closed hearings, during which the rapporteur, the co-rapporteur, the State representatives, and other interested parties presented their arguments. The Commission then decided whether the complaint was founded (Art 579 GC). Deliberations were held in the absence of the parties, although the rules of procedure did not specify whether they were secret (Art 29 RPMC). Resolutions were passed by a majority vote of the full Commission (Art 20 RPMC). The Governments were under the obligation to 'do everything necessary, without delay, to comply with the Commission's resolutions' (Art 584 (1) GC). Once it had been notified of the president's opinion, the Minorities Office forwarded it to the competent national authorities and, at the request of the president, to the petitioners. The Minorities
Minority Rights Petitions
Office had to report back to the president if and how the matter had been settled (Arts 154, 156 GC).
This information had to be communicated within twenty days (Art 44 RPMC). However, as noted before, the national authorities were under no obligation to follow the president's opinions.
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Petitioners were under no obligation to appoint a professional lawyer as their legal representative ( Self-representation). This was in fact rather uncommon, as most petitioners chose to issue a mandate to a minority association (an example of such a mandate can be found in Stone, 1933, 58) . Petitioners not satisfied with the outcome of the local procedure could appeal the decision before the Council of the League of Nations (Art 149 GC). In this case, the president transferred the files of the case to the Minorities Section of the League Secretariat (Calonder, 1937, XIII) 
F. Cases Handled by the Commission 38
Although the Commission was initially created as a dispute settlement body focussing on interState disputes relating to administrative, social, and economic matters, its eventual role in this regard was virtually non-existent, as almost all disputes of that nature were settled amicably between the two governments. Conversely, its president was almost immediately confronted with an avalanche of minority rights petitions. Responding to these petitions and negotiating with States in order to protect the rights of minorities soon became the Commission's main activity, and its most lasting legacy.
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Possible reasons behind this unexpected development were already identified by some of the protagonists of the Upper Silesian treaty rights protection system. Thus, in his speech at the Commission's closing ceremony on 15 July 1937, Calonder noted that economic disputes, being ultimately of a purely 'material' nature, could be resolved more easily by mutual agreement than minority rights issues, which he characterized as ultimately founded on 'sentiment'. He also deplored the two Minorities Offices' inability to deal effectively with petitions on a national level. Kaeckenbeeck, for his part, noted that 'Government officials dislike and distrust international organs not amenable to the same kind of considerations and pressure which are apt to carry victory in national administrative circles', whereas members of a minority 'whenever under a sense of being wronged, [are] only too prone to appeal to international protection'. He concluded that 'the protection of the population of territories subjected to changes of sovereignty is not and cannot be satisfactorily ensured by international organs which only the Governments themselves can set in motion ' (1942, at 481-82 ).
Inter-State Disputes 40
The Commission received a total of 18 State complaints. Two were filed by Poland. One concerned the importation of German coke into Polish Upper Silesia. It was the only case which led to a resolution by the Commission, although it was later settled amicably. Another related to export of cereals to German Upper Silesia. It was eventually withdrawn. The remaining 16, filed by Germany, concerned the maintenance of German laws in Polish Upper Silesia. All were eventually struck from the Commission's list of cases by mutual agreement.
(a) Maintenance of German Laws in Polish Upper Silesia
41
Of the 16 cases filed by Germany with regard to the maintenance of its laws in Polish Upper Silesia, 12 concerned land distribution; the remaining four, labour legislation. While six cases were withdrawn and one resolved by a mutual agreement, the remaining nine were left in abeyance until the winding up of the Commission. According to Kaeckenbeeck, most complaints had been filed hastily, due to the strict time limit of two months fixed by Article 2 GC. Once the parties realized that they had nothing to gain from resolution of the Commission, let alone a judgment of the PCIJ, they disengaged from the proceedings (1942, at 41-42) . Reports, discussions, and oral debates then followed upon the written procedure. Little more than a year after the case had been raised, a compromise solution was proposed by the President of the Mixed Commission and adopted ' (1942, at 468) .
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The regime of the Geneva Convention provided, in principle, for national autonomy with regard to customs (Art 216 GC). For the duration of the transitional regime, both States were, however, obliged to exempt from customs duty 'the natural products which originate in and come from one of the two zones of the plebiscite area, and are destined for consumption or use in the other zone' (Art 218 GC). On 24 February 1926, Poland filed a complaint against Germany under Article 237 GC. The Chamber of commerce of Oppeln/Opole in German Upper Silesia had, in fact, invoked quantitative restrictions to limit importation of cereals from Polish Upper Silesia. The German State representative agreed that this measure was a breach of Article 218 GC, and explained, both in writing and before the Mixed Commission, that quotas were no longer being applied to cereals from Polish Upper Silesia.
Poland eventually withdrew its complaint.
Minority Rights Petitions 44
Calonder received an overall number of 2,283 petitions under Article 149 GC, 1,613 of which were filed by the German minority, 522 by the Polish minority, and 148 by the Jewish minority (all of which originated in German Upper Silesia). Of these 2,283, 1,929 were settled amicably, which underlines the importance of conciliation within the Commission's work. Another 227 were left unresolved. Only 127 resulted in formal opinions, many of which were rejected by the Government authorities. The summary procedure under Article 585 GC led to 1,180 petitions.
(a) Protection of Life and Liberty 45 Pursuant to Articles 66 and 83 GC, Germany and Poland were under the obligation 'to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of the plebiscite territory, without distinction of party, nationality, language, race or religion'. This proved especially challenging during the waves of violence that gripped Upper Silesia on several occasions.
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Immediately after its creation in July 1922, the Commission was confronted with a situation of general lawlessness, with minorities on both sides suffering attacks and expulsion by armed civilians.
Its reaction was to organize a meeting between the Polish and German authorities, in order to take active steps for the return of refugees, the coordination of police operations on both sides of the border, and the effective prosecution of illegal acts. Subsequent agreements to this effect were made in consultation with the Commission. A similar method was followed to reduce the tensions created by the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923.
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Petitions relating to the protection of life and liberty were generally filed according to the procedure under Article 585 GC, which allowed for speedier action than that under Article 149 GC. Upper Silesia issued a proclamation to the effect that all statutes and orders, either promulgated since 1 April 1933 or in the future, would have no validity in the area in so far as they contained provisions of exception for 'non-Aryans'. Similar measures were taken to end boycott actions against Jewish stores and the diffusion of the anti-Semitic periodical Der Stürmer. Although the Nazi authorities were often reluctant to enforce these guarantees, the social exclusion of Jews was markedly less severe in Upper Silesia than in the rest of Germany (Karch, 2013, 150-51) . the three main minority associations (German, Polish, and Jewish , 2, 11, 12, 17, 20, 21, 26, 33, 36) .
He also formulated the general principle according to which questions not addressed by express special provisions of the Convention should be solved in accordance with its general provisions, ie in the sense of protecting minority education rather than restricting it (Opinion 31). On 15 December 1926, reaffirming his interpretation of Articles 74 and 131 GC, Calonder even went as far as declaring individual self-determination an 'absolute necessity' in a culturally diverse border region such as Upper Silesia (Opinion 40, IV para 2). However, he conceded that it was possible to restrict access to German minority schools to children that actually spoke German (Opinion 40, V). The matter was referred to (Kaeckenbeeck, 1942, 333) . les minorités de la Haute Silésie à la générosité de leurs grands et puissants États' [translation by the author]) (Kaeckenbeeck, 1942, 853) .
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The Commission's archives were later deposited at the Secretariat of the League of Nations in Geneva.
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Authors of the interwar period tended to refer to the Upper Silesian regime as an 'experiment' (eg Stone, Kaeckenbeeck, de Azcárate, Korowicz), thus underlining its singular character and uncertain fate. In his 1942 book, Kaeckenbeeck, who had presided over the Arbitral Tribunal between 1922 and 1937, readily acknowledged all procedural shortcomings of the Upper Silesian system and recognized that it had been unable to stop the 'decline' of minorities in both parts of the territory. He nevertheless deemed it to be a partial success, at least insofar as it had fulfilled the Geneva Convention's limited objective, which was 'to endow with a peaceful and legal character a period of readjustment'. He hoped that it would inspire similar attempts in a context marked by more 'good will ' (1942, at 355-56, 537-38) . Conversely, the Polish legal scholar and former head of the Polish Minority Office in Upper Silesia, Marek Stanisław Korowicz was of the opinion that Calonder, as president of the Mixed Commission, had indeed often been able to appease relations between Poles and Germans. This did not prevent him from deeming the mechanism a failure with regard to the protection of minorities in this region. In his eyes, no legal or diplomatic mechanism could have worked in Upper Silesia, since Germans and Poles (as well as Germans and Czechs) had simply become unable to live peacefully side by side, as the German minority's involvement with the Nazis before and after 1939 had confirmed. In this kind of situation, the only answer, 'however painful and upsetting' ('si douloureuse et bouleversante qu'elle soit' [translation by the author]) was transferring minorities to their own national State, rather than giving them special rights within the majority's national State. However, Korowicz did consider that the Upper Silesian 'experiment' did provide insights 'of exceptional importance' for the international protection of minorities in other regions of the world, or, indeed, 'for the international protection of man ' in general (1946, at 160-74) .
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Since 
